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Introduction
This paper examines the political economy of the 
agricultural policy processes in Malawi through the lenses 
of the fertilizer subsidy programme that has raised the 
profile of the country on the international stage since 
2006. Malawi is a regular feature in the international 
agricultural policy debates as a model for the rest of Africa 
to emulate in order to achieve a uniquely African Green 
Revolution (Dugger, 2007; Perkins, 2009; AGRA, 2009). 
Through its subsidy programme, and against fierce 
resistance by donors as well as some local fiscal 
conservatives, the argument is that Malawi has pioneered 
the implementation of smart subsidy that has transformed 
the country from a perpetual food beggar for close to 
two successive decades to a self reliant nation. 
This is underlined by the fact that since the introduction 
of the fertilizer subsidy programme, the country has 
consistently produced surplus maize over and above its 
annual food requirements estimated at 2.1 million metric 
tonnes. In this narrative, the 2006/07 growing season is 
particularly singled out. Malawi achieved a 53 percent 
food surplus from a 43 percent deficit in 2005, some of 
which was exported to neighbouring countries. These 
achievements are used as a reference point in advocating 
for the case for smart subsidy as the only feasible way to 
resuscitate African agriculture as an engine of economic 
growth for sustainable poverty reduction. The argument 
is that “if Malawi can do it, it can be done by every country 
in Africa” (AGRA, 2009: 1)
There is, nevertheless, some enduring debate about 
whether the Malawi model that has become almost a 
sacrosanct point of reference in contemporary African 
agricultural policy debates is sustainable or not (Minot 
and Benson, 2009). This debate has been led mainly by 
a group of donors who are sceptical about the return to 
subsidies, whether smart or not, as a lasting solution to 
the revival of the fledging African agriculture. They argue 
that smart subsidies are no different from the traditional 
forms of subsidies but perhaps more critically that African 
governments do not have the capacity to administer 
subsidy programmes in a transparent and accountable 
manner without creating expansive opportunities for 
rent seeking (van de Walle, 2001 and Minot & Benson, 
2009).
The debate about whether or not the Malawian model 
of the fertilizer subsidy is sustainable is driven by concerns 
with its design. The sceptics doubt that the subsidy 
programme will catalyze sustainable transformation of 
the Malawi’s agricultural sector, arguing that it is merely 
a politically driven programme meant to serve the 
interests of the ruling elite to retain and consolidate their 
political power, influence and authority. These are 
legitimate concerns especially in view of some literature 
that characterizes Malawi’s politics as essentially the 
politics of maize (Smale, 1995; Harrigan, 2001; Sahely, et 
al., 2005). The basic argument is that the legitimacy of 
the Malawi state is closely related to its ability to make 
maize, the country’s staple, available to the people. This 
could either be through subsidizing production or 
making maize available through the market at affordable 
prices. Therefore, access to maize forms a critical 
component of the social contract between the Malawi 
state and its people. 
Taken against this backdrop, the sceptics about the 
transformative potential of the subsidy programme 
argue that the absence of a clear roadmap of its 
implementation detailing out a possible exit strategy 
suggests the huge stakes that the political elite across 
the political divide attach to it. There has not been any 
public debate among the political elites about an exit 
strategy apart from how the administration of the 
programme could be improved in order to guarantee 
food security at all times. Debates about the FISP among 
the technocrats are stymied by the preponderance of 
political considerations about the programme. For the 
sceptics, therefore, the threat of political capture of the 
programme for short-term goals - with the potential of 
almost entirely disregarding efforts directed at catalyzing 
the long-term structural transformation of the agricultural 
sector as an engine for sustainable poverty reduction - is 
always imminent. Consequently, the motivation to 
enhance the soundness of the programme design and 
its overall technical efficiency is unlikely to take 
precedence as long as the primary political goals are 
satisfied. As long as the question of food security is 
addressed, there is no sense of urgency to use the subsidy 
programme as a vehicle for sustainable rural 
transformation.
In addition, there is also a strong argument that the 
surplus production of maize registered since the launch 
of the FISP cannot be entirely attributed to design, 
implementation and management efficiency and 
effectiveness of the FISP. It is argued that the favourable 
weather patterns since the 2005/06 growing season have 
greatly contributed to the success of the FISP (Dorward, 
et al., 2008). There is so to speak simply no way of 
establishing whether the investment in the FISP is the 
most efficient way of using scarce resources. There are 
some alternative means of achieving the very same 
objectives of the FISP such as low cost financial services, 
improved research and extension and new risk 
management mechanisms among many others. For 
instance, empirical results from Zambia indicate that 
favourable weather patterns contributed heavily to the 
record bumper harvest in the 2009/10 growing season. 
Zambia recorded a 48 percent remarkable increase in 
maize harvest over and above the 2008/09 growing 
season’s harvest. Detailed empirical analysis showed that 
the largest factor contributing to yield growth was the 
weather, explaining up to 61 percent of the increase in 
yield while fertilizer use from both the private sector and 
the subsidy programme explained an additional 32 
percent of the yield increase (Burke, et al., 2010).
The foregoing debate has provided an inspiration for 
this paper to critically examine the political economy of 
agricultural policy processes in Malawi using the fertilizer 
subsidy programme. This is further important for two 
reasons. Malawi reinstated democracy in May 1994 and, 
according to democratic theorists, this introduces a 
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different set of incentives for policy making since voters 
are expected to exchange their votes with sound polices 
that directly respond to their pressing priorities (Poulton, 
2011). This is of particular significance as a result of the 
unprecedented transformation of the country’s political 
reconfiguration following the May 2009 general elections, 
the fourth elections since the reinstatement of a 
democratic political dispensation in May 1994. 
The May 2009 elections were unique in two main ways. 
Unlike in the previous three national elections, the 
governing party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 
won the elections with landslide victories at both 
presidential and parliamentary levels. The election results 
defied the regional, ethnic and tribal patterns of voting 
that seemed so entrenched in the previous three general 
elections. These victories essentially appeared to have 
de-regionalized and de-ethnicized the country’s 
configuration and alignment of political forces and 
interests. This potential reconfiguration of political power 
coincided with the revival of agriculture as a leading 
strategic sector underpinned by commitment at the 
highest possible political and policy levels within the 
framework of the Comprehensive African Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP).  African governments 
have committed to invest at least 10 percent of their 
national budgets into agriculture, the goal being to 
achieve and sustain growth at a minimum level of 6 
percentwhich is required to achieve agricultural led 
socio-economic growth (Anderson, 2011). This is widely 
viewed as a potential push toward technocratic policy 
making since the activities in the agricultural sector will 
be systematically mediated through a robust investment 
framework responding to priorities arrived at through 
highly consultative processes among professional players 
from the different segments of the agricultural sector.
The political economy perspective is ideal for this 
paper because it provides the opportunity to get to grips 
with the political, economic and social processes that 
either promote or block pro-poor change as well as the 
role of institutions, power and the underlying context 
for policy processes (Synder, 2005 and Scoones, 2005). 
This, inter alia, suggests that policies are more effective 
when they are informed by an understanding of power 
relations, incentives and change processes. According 
to Araujo, et al., (2004), the political economy approach 
underpins steps of discussion, negotiation, approval and 
implementation in the policy processes which are at the 
core of the messy world of politics. This implies that 
making and shaping of policy is less a set of organized, 
predictable and rational choices than a complex, often 
unpredictable and above all political process (de Janvry 
and Sadoulet, 2008). The hallmark of the political 
economy perspective is that context matters a great deal 
since policies’ chance of success cannot be judged 
abstractly on their theoretical or technical attributes 
without considering the institutional, political and 
cultural context in which they are applied.
This paper draws heavily from previous work on the 
fertilizer subsidy programme carried out also under the 
auspices of the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC). 
Two pieces of work are particularly notable: Reclaiming 
Policy Space: Lessons from Malawi’s Fertilizer Subsidy 
Programme and Seed and Subsidies: The Political Economy 
of Input Programmes in Malawi. These were further 
complemented by extensive literature review that 
included relevant fertilizer subsidy documentation as 
well as key informant interviews. These interviews were 
carried out with officials of government, donor and civil 
society organizations between August and December 
2010. The key informant interviews opted for anonymity 
because of the political sensitivity of the subject matter. 
The sentiments of the key informant interviews are 
therefore identified only through the dates on which the 
interviews were held. This does not, however, in any way 
undermine the veracity of the overall analysis and 
conclusions drawn from the fieldwork.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next 
section examines the agricultural policy context and 
performance in a historical and contemporary 
perspective. Section three outlines the distinctive 
features of Malawi’s political system with particular focus 
on their implications for the agricultural policy processes. 
The fourth section discusses the fertilizer subsidy 
programme as a case study to interrogate the underlying 
dynamics of the agricultural policy processes in the 
country. The distinctive features of the political system 
are invoked in order to understand or explain positive 
or negative developments pertaining to the 
implementation of the fertilizer subsidy programme 
since its inauguration during the 2005/06 growing 
season. The fifth and final section offers some concluding 
reflections with particular focus on the implications of 
the fertilizer experiences for the broader agricultural 
policy processes in Malawi.
Agricultural Policy Context 
and Performance in Malawi
Malawi is a predominantly an agrarian economy with 
85 percent of the people dependent on agriculture as 
their principal source of livelihood (Chirwa, et al., 2006 
and Chinsinga, 2008). Agriculture contributes over 90 
percent of the country’s export earnings, accounts for 
85 percent of the total employment and contributes 39 
percent to the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).
The major distinctive feature of the agricultural sector 
in Malawi is its dualistic nature which has had important 
implications for its performance. It comprises the estate 
and smallholder sub-sectors. The smallholder sector, with 
cropping systems dominated by rain-fed farming, is 
characterized by low levels of inputs and outputs yet it 
produces more than 70 percent of the total food and 
contributes about 20 percent to agricultural exports 
(Chirwa, et al., 2006). The second sub-sector is comprised 
of estates mostly growing tea, coffee and tobacco for 
export.
The dualistic nature of the agricultural sector has had 
important structural implications for the agricultural 
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sector. The size of smallholder farmers’ lands have 
dramatically declined to about 0.5 ha per capita because 
of high birth rates, lack of alternative employment in 
urban areas which keeps people on their farms, and the 
1967 Land Act allowed for one way transfer of land from 
the smallholder sector to the estate sector. Until 2002 
when a new land policy was promulgated (but not yet 
enacted into law) vast tracts of land were transferred 
from the smallholder to the estate sector at modest levels 
of compensation (Kanyongolo, 2005 and Peters 
&Kambewa, 2007). The sectors also differed in terms of 
the range of crops that they cultivated. While those 
engaged in estate farming were at liberty to cultivate a 
variety of crops without limit those within the smallholder 
sector were legally prohibited from producing cash crops 
such as burley tobacco, sugar and tea to avoid oversupply 
of the market and poor quality produce. In the case of 
tobacco this was regulated through the issuance of 
quotas to farmers. This partly accounts for the fact that 
while the estate sector contributes about 20 percent of 
the total national production it accounts for over 80 
percent of agricultural exports comprising mainly of 
burley tobacco, sugar and tea (GoM, 2005).
Very little structural transformation has taken place 
in the country’s agricultural sector in recent decades. 
Instead of diminishing in importance, the agricultural 
sector is becoming increasingly important to the country’s 
overall economic portfolio (Chinsinga, 2002 and Chirwa, 
et al., 2006). The increase in importance of the agricultural 
sector is attributed to the devastating effects of structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) on the manufacturing 
sector. Most of the industries that closed down were state 
run enterprises that could not survive competition 
Figure I: Map of Malawi Showing Agro-Ecological Zones and ADDs
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because they no longer enjoyed subsidies from the 
government. The rapid rate of deindustrialization was 
further reinforced by rampant infrastructure decay which 
was inevitable due to the implementation of SAPs.  The 
industrial sector was further negatively affected by the 
dramatic devaluation of the local currency. Being reliant 
on imported raw materials, the devaluation of the 
currency inflated their operational costs which most of 
these industries could not sustain. The contribution of 
the manufacturing sector to the country’s GDP declined 
from 16 to 11 percent between 1994 and 2004 either 
because of the total collapse of some industries or 
relocation of these industries to neighbouring countries 
within the region. The manufacturing sector now 
accounts for about 11 percent of GDP of which agro-
processing constitutes 26 percent.
Farmers cultivate a wide range of crops in Malawi. 
These include maize, tobacco, tea, coffee, sugarcane, 
pulses, groundnuts, cotton, cassava, sorghum and rice 
(Chirwa and Zakeyo, 2003). These crops are cultivated 
across the country although in varying degrees of 
concentration depending on the agro-ecological 
conditions. The country is divided into eight Agricultural 
Development Divisions (ADDs) on the basis of variations 
in agro-ecological conditions. The ADDs include Karonga, 
Mzuzu, Kasungu, Salima, Machinga, Ngabu, Lilongwe, 
Blantyre and Shire Valleyas depicted in Figure I.
The crops cultivated by farmers are further 
distinguished into cash and food crops. However, some 
of the crops qualify both as cash crop and food crops. 
The main cash crops include tobacco, tea and sugar of 
which tobacco is the main foreign exchange earner. 
Historically it has contributed much as 65 percent of total 
foreign exchange earnings followed by tea and sugar 
which contribute 11 and 10 percent respectively (Chirwa, 
2004 and Chirwa, et al., 2006), though this is changing 
as mining operations come on line and the trade in 
tobacco falters. The livestock industry is very small in 
Malawi contributing only about 7 percent to the 
agricultural sector’s GDP. It is largely constituted by 
ruminants such as cattle, goats and sheep and 
monogastrics such as pigs and chickens, and provides 
for both subsistence and commercial requirements. 
Maize is a dominant food crop across the country which 
takes up as much as 80 percent of the total cropped land, 
the agro-ecological variations across the country 
notwithstanding, as reflected in Table 1 below.
Everywhere in Malawi maize is a dominant crop, 
despite the agro-ecological variations across the country. 
Also maize covers a disproportionate share of hectarage 
in each ADD. According to Hassan, et al., (1996), Malawi 
has the highest per capita consumption of maize in the 
world. Thus maize constitutes the primary staple of the 
rural population in terms of diets as well as cropping 
patterns. This is further underscored by Denning, et al., 
(2009) who observe that maize is grown by an average 
of 97 (93 to 99) percent of farming households and 
accounts for 60 percent of the total calorie consumption. 
Recent data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security is quite illustrative of the dominance of maize 
in the crop portfolio of smallholder farmers in Malawi. 
The combined growing area of other staples like rice, 
sorghum, millet, cassava, sweet potatoes and Irish 
potatoes does not even reach one third of that of maize. 
The government’s efforts to diversify away from maize 
are not registering any impact. Apparently there is a 
reversal of some gains in the efforts to diversify as a result 
of the dominance of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
(FISP).
Since the food security of the nation depends on 
maize, it has become a political crop. The apparent 
prominence of maize as further demonstrated below is 
inevitable due to the frequent episodes of food insecurity 
since the turn of the 1990s which eventually saw the 
introduction of the fertilizer subsidy programme. As early 
as 1995, Smale described maize in Malawi as life while 
Sahely, et al., (2005) recognized the importance of maize 
in the vitality as well as legitimacy of the state. They 
observed that the legitimacy of politicians is closely 
linked to the availability and accessibility of maize to 
people at the grassroots at prices they can afford, either 
through their own production or buying from the market. 
The agricultural sector has experienced dramatic revival 
in recent years after a prolonged period of stagnation 
beginning at the turn of the 1990s (Chirwa, et al., 2006).
The revival of growth in the agricultural sector coincided 
with the implementation of the fertilizer subsidy 
programme during the 2005/06 growing season. It is 
estimated that the agricultural sector grew at an average 
of 2.2 percent in 2000-05, while it averaged between 9.2 
Table 1: Average Hectarage under crop production from 2000 to 2010
Crop KRADD MZADD KADD SADD LADD MADD BLADD SVADD
Maize 42138 145253 308769 75154 340842 300895 220962 78848
Millet 2003 9366 890 3602 10395 4583 973 10571
Pulses 10965 43972 79040 4527 110110 83524 170573 25684
Cotton 91 363 653 37 910 690 1410 212
Cassava 16076 37817 14215 27983 17039 27239 36361 1376
Sorghum 150 0 146 524 1050 18888 27557 16080
Rice 8522 2262 948 7559 2664 18018 8361 5638
G/nuts 997 3997 7185 412 10010 7593 15507 2335
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, 2010
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percent between 2006 and 2009. The high growth rates 
are supported by production surplus of maize over and 
above the annual requirements for the country, which 
are estimated at 2.1 million metric tonnes since the 
2005/06 growing season. In the 2005/06 growing season, 
total maize production stood at 2,611,486, half a million 
metric tonnes over the annual food requirement. The 
production shot to a claimed record 3, 444, 655 metric 
tonnes in the 2006/07 growing season and slumped to 
about 2, 948, 509 metric tonnes during 2007/08, which 
was still well above the national annual food requirements 
(UNESCO, 2009 and Chinsinga, 2010).
The impressive productivity levels were experienced 
after a protracted period of stagnation punctuated by 
episodes of chronic bouts of hunger and food shortages, 
even famine in places. According to Devereux (2002), 
Malawi had shifted from being nationally self-sufficient 
in maize in non-drought years to being dependent on 
food aid and commercial food imports. This trend can 
be traced back to the late 1980s when Malawi hosted 
about 1 million Mozambican refuges. This exerted 
pressure on the country’s food supply especially since 
the civil war in Mozambique cut off Malawi from the 
Angonia region which was a source of cheap informal 
imports. The capacity of the country to feed itself was 
further decimated, inter alia, by regular bouts of flash 
floods and droughts, removal of fertilizer and hybrid 
maize seed subsidies in the mid 1990s2  and sharp 
devaluation of the local currency that made inputs 
virtually unaffordable to the majority of chronically 
impoverished smallholder farmers, many of whom 
accessed improved inputs through a subsidized credit 
system run by the government through the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation. This was 
underlined by two severe hunger crises during the 
2001/02 and 2004/05 growing seasons that have had far 
reaching consequences on the policy trajectory of the 
agricultural sector in the country.
The 2001/02 hunger crisis affected over 3.2 million 
people. Translated in terms of food requirements, the 
deficit of maize was as high as 630, 000 metric tonnes 
but if other foodstuffs are taken into account, the deficit 
marginally fell to 570, 000 metric tonnes (Stambuli, 2002 
and Owusu&N’gambi, 2002). The incidence of hunger in 
2002 is also partly attributed to the decision by the 
government to sell off maize from the strategic grain 
reserves to Kenya on the advice of the IMF. It is alleged 
that the maize from the strategic grain reserves was 
disposed of corruptly which made it difficult for the 
government to source food imports on time to cushion 
the hunger crisis. Meanwhile, the 2004/05 hunger crisis 
affected more than four million people translating to a 
food deficit of about 700,000 metric tonnes (Chimphonda 
and Dzoole-Mwale, 2005). According to Sahely, et al., 
(2005), these experiences contributed greatly to turning 
food security into a highly charged political issue. Food 
security has since the 2001/02 hunger crisis “appeared 
in the platforms of politicians, on the agendas of policy 
makers, in the programmes of public bureaucracies, 
among the duties of village chiefs, and on the pages of 
national newspapers and is thoroughly researched and 
debated” (Sahely, et al., 2005: 17). 
Since the turn of the 1980s, the agricultural policy 
framework had been shaped by the ideological intent 
of SAPs (Kaluwa, et al., 1992; Mhone, 1992; Chilowa, et 
al., 2000). Malawi was the first country in the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC) region to 
embrace SAPs in 1981 as a remedy to resuscitate 
economic growth. SAPs were meant to address the 
structural rigidities of the country’s economy manifested 
through: 1) slow growth of smallholder exports; 2) the 
narrowness of the export base and increased reliance 
on tobacco; 3) dependency on imported fuel and on a 
declining stock of domestic fuel wood; 4) the rapid 
deterioration of parastatal finances; and 5) the inflexible 
system of government administered prices and wages 
(Chilowa, et al., 2000). Malawi drew on three different 
SAP loan facilities in addition to four sector specific reform 
packages which included the following: 1) Industry and 
Trade Policy Adjustment Credit (ITPAC) 1988; 2) Agriculture 
Sector Adjustment Credit (ASAC) 1990; 3) Entrepreneurship 
Development and Drought Recovery Programme 
(EDDRP); and Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation 
Programme (FRDP) 1996.
The ASAC is particularly critical because it shaped the 
policy trajectory of the agricultural sector until recently. 
According to the World Bank (1990), the main objectives 
of the ASAC were to increase efficiency and improve 
incomes of smallholder farmers, increase efficiency of 
land use and protect the environment, and improve the 
macroeconomic environment through further import 
liberalization and public expenditure restructuring. The 
policy instruments involved included smallholder price 
adjustments, liberalization of fertilizer marketing, removal 
of subsidies, liberalization of burley tobacco, and 
adjustment of estate rents in the mid 1990s.
Reviews of SAPs particularly in the agricultural sector 
are hardly positive (Kaluwa, et al., 1992 and Chilowa, et 
al., 2000). They emphasize that SAPs inflicted heavy social 
burdens on the vulnerable segments of society mainly 
because their design did not take into account the 
potentially adverse effects on the poor in short and 
medium terms. The implementation of SAPs led to 
dramatic changes in the nature of the agricultural sector 
which until then had guaranteed food security among 
the smallholder farmers. The collapse of the smallholder 
farmer credit system as a result of the swift implementation 
of SAPs, combined with the removal of fertilizer and 
hybrid maize seed subsidies against the backdrop of a 
sharply devalued currency, made farm inputs virtually 
unaffordable to the majority of the chronically 
impoverished farmers.
It is further argued that the food security status of 
most households became more precarious because of 
the reforms targeted at the Agricultural Development 
and Marketing Development Corporation (ADMARC). 
The ADMARC reforms under the auspices of SAPs involved 
management restructuring, closure of its uneconomic 
markets and liberalization of the marketing of smallholder 
crops (Christiansen and Stackhouse, 1989). However, the 
private sector, widely projected to fill the vacuum, was 
hardly forthcoming. The hardest hit therefore were the 
poor and/or isolated households that traditionally 
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depended on ADMARC for the purchase of maize for 
their consumption. Private traders have emerged but 
only in areas with better roads, leaving the great bulk of 
the smallholders outside the circuit of agricultural input, 
credit and produce markets, thus exacerbating food 
insecurity (Peters, 1996 and Oxfam, 2002). Furthermore, 
low and falling soil productivity aggravated by lack of 
income to purchase fertilizer inputs have led to a reliance 
on low input agriculture and to severe food insecurity 
problems, as well as dependence on imports of maize 
mainly from South Africa and informally from Tanzania 
and Mozambique (Anderson, 2011).
The intractable hunger problems prompted the 
government to experiment with various initiatives in 
order to guarantee food security for the people, who 
had little non-farm income to purchase food. The first 
major response to the deteriorating food security 
situation was the Starter Pack (SP) programme. Launched 
in the 1998/99 growing season and heavily supported 
by the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID), the SP programme extended to all rural farming 
families, estimated at 2.86 million households, and 
consisted of free inputs containing 0.1 ha worth of 
fertilizer and legume seed. The SP programme was 
repeated in the 1999/00 growing season. It was seen by 
its timing to be linked to electioneering. It was launched 
just a year before the general elections of June 1999. It 
was therefore widely seen as a strategy on the part of 
the governing party to win votes since it responded to 
the major concern of the people, the deteriorating food 
security situation in the country.
However, for purposes of sustainability and as a 
gradual exit strategy, the SP was scaled down to the 
Targeted Input Programme (TIP) in the 2000/01 growing 
season. Then almost half of the rural farming families 
were beneficiaries. The TIP was phased out in the 2004/05 
growing season following the withdrawal of DFID’s 
financial support as the sole donor to the programme. 
Taking its place that year was the Extended Targeted 
Input Programme (ETIP). It was designated as such 
because it provided a package of 26kg fertilizer and 5kg 
of seed to about 2.8 million beneficiaries compared to 
the regular TIP programme. This was almost essentially 
a return to the Starter Pack but did not make any 
difference because the inputs were supplied to farmers 
very late to be useful in a year that there was also severe 
drought.
Neither SP nor TIP achieved the strategic goal of 
ensuring food security in the country. Except for the 
1999/00 growing season, food production remained far 
below the required levels. This was underlined by the 
severe hunger incidences in the 2001/02 and 2004/05 
growing seasons. The persistence of food shortages 
despite the SP/TIP/ETIP interventions provided the 
platform to question the wisdom of continuing on this 
path of support to the agricultural sector (Chinsinga, 
2007).
In spite of doubts by donors and analysts, FISP was 
introduced by government in the 2005/06 growing 
season. The introduction of the FISP combined with 
favourable weather and climatic patterns, have ensured 
that Malawi is able to meet its national food requirements 
without recourse to commercial imports or massive food 
aid. There are, of course, still pockets where people still 
depend on the World Food Programme interventions.
It is, however, important to note that while Malawi 
was producing a food surplus, the government continued 
to intervene in the maize markets (Chirwa, 2009). Through 
a presidential directive, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food Security reintroduced a price band in 2008 for maize 
whose aim is to stabilize prices and make maize affordable 
and accessible by the poorest Malawians. It was meant 
to establish floor prices to protect farmers’ incomes and 
ceiling prices to protect consumers (Chirwa, et al., 2006). 
The political significance of the government’s intervention 
in the maize market cannot be overemphasized. It is 
justified as a strategy to protect farmers from the 
exploitative tendencies of unscrupulous traders since 
markets, especially in remote areas, hardly exist 
(Chinsinga, 2004 and Chirwa, 2009). 
There have been some significant changes in the 
overarching policy framework for the agricultural sector 
in the country following the adoption of CAADP which, 
as stipulated above, commits African governments to 
invest at least 10 percent of their budgets in agriculture. 
These changes have been further reinforced by the 
adoption of the second generation poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSPs) that are widely touted as home-
grown. In Malawi, the government adopted the Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) in 2006 which 
provides an overarching policy direction for wealth 
creation and economic growth as a means of reducing 
poverty on a sustainable basis. A second MGDS has been 
prepared for the period between 2012 and 2016 and 
essentially continues with minor modifications the 
pursuit of permanent poverty reduction through 
sustainable economic growth. It also sees agriculture as 
a key area of support and growth.
Through the CAADP initiative and in tune with the 
underlying spirit of the MGDS, the government has 
developed the Agricultural Sector Wide Approach 
(ASWAp) for the period between 2008 and 2012. The 
ASWAp is basically a prioritized results-orientated 
framework for implementing the agricultural components 
of the MGDS and is aimed at achieving harmonized and 
gradually aligned investments by government and 
donors. The ASWAp essentially operationalizes the MGDS 
in the areas of agriculture, food security, irrigation and 
disaster risk reduction. The main priorities of the ASWAp 
are: 1) improved food security at household and national 
levels; 2) commercial agriculture, agro-processing and 
market development; 3) sustainable agricultural land and 
water management; 4) climate change; and 5) key 
support services, namely: institutional development and 
capacity building and agricultural research and extension 
services.
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Politics and Policy in Malawi
Conceptual Framework
The debate about politics and policy in sub-Saharan 
Africa has become more complex requiring nuanced 
analyses following the advent of democratization since 
the turn of the 1990s (Lindberg, 2003). The introduction 
of democracy in a country is expected to fundamentally 
alter not only the structures but also the incentives that 
inform and guide policy processes. Thus in theory, voters 
in a democracy exchange their votes for a set of policies 
that respond to their interests. In that case in Africa 
agricultural policies should be high on political parties’ 
agendas since the majority of African people live in rural 
areas and depend almost entirely on agriculture for their 
livelihoods.
As further demonstrated below, there are alternative 
frameworks to democracy, for understanding policy 
processes in a polity. Prior to the advent of democracy 
in most developing countries in the late 1980s, there 
were two dominant explanations about how policy 
processes could be understood in the African context 
(Whitfield and Therkildsen, 2011). The two focus on 
neopatrimonialism and on the implementation of SAPs 
as explanatory variables for the failure of policy processes 
in Africa.
The basic thrust of neopatrimonialism is that politics 
both caused Africa’s economic stagnation and prohibited 
the state from adopting economic reforms and developing 
developmental institutions (Whitfield and Therkildsen, 
2011). It is argued that the government essentially 
functions as a transfer pump of resources by political 
leaders to their respective clients in return for support 
(van Wyk, 2007). Leaders and their opponents use both 
formal and informal rules, norms and practices to gain 
legitimacy and advantage in a winner takes all competition 
for the control of the state. Neopatrimonialism thus 
expounds how formal and informal institutions coexist 
to facilitate or frustrate the realization of development 
goals and objectives.
The alternative explanation is that Africa’s economic 
stagnation is due to the implementation of neoliberal 
policy reforms which created room for expansive 
influence of Western aid agencies in African policymaking. 
This impacted negatively on the scope and capacity of 
the state (Mkandawire, 1998 and Chikulo, 1998).In most 
African countries, the state had already been substantially 
weakened by the colonial legacy, tribal, regional and 
ethnic tendencies (Sandbrook, 1993).
The major criticism against these explanations is that 
they do not offer any insights into cases of successful 
state intervention in the economy and variations across 
countries, or across sectors within the same country. The 
anti neoliberal explanations for economic stagnation 
overlook the importance of domestic politics in shaping 
the incentives facing state elites as well as how foreign 
aid relations and domestic politics interact (Whitfield and 
Therkildsen, 2011). In defence, the neoliberals would 
argue that SAPs failed not because their prescriptions 
are inherently deficient but rather because most African 
countries did not implement the SAPs properly (Banik, 
2006).
The positive impact of democracy on policy processes, 
at least in the short term, is debatable, however. The 
theoretical potential of democracy in creating a perfect 
market for policies that respond to the pressing priorities 
of the largest constituency is encumbered by several 
factors. It is argued that regardless of being the largest 
constituency, the poor in democracies are unable to 
effectively agitate for pro-poor policies because they are 
a heterogeneous social group (Moore and Putzel, 1999). 
They do not only have to overcome the enormous costs 
associated with political action but also their “multiple 
and potentially contradictory loyalties which may 
undermine political solidarity around class based 
identities such as small farmers, landless, wage workers, 
tenants, recipients of food subsidies, squatters etc” 
(Johnson, 2001: 11).The multiplication of demands on 
the state resulting from the universal franchise of a 
citizenry such as this makes democracies more inclined 
to direct rather than indirect methods of policy 
implementation, which include subsidies and hand-outs. 
Examples of indirect policy measures include exchange 
rate devaluation, tariff reductions and privatization of 
public enterprises among many others. These policies 
are not favoured because neopatrimonial states are 
generally pre or very weak capitalist states with no or 
little class formation.
These factors suggest that democracies may or may 
not promote technocratic policy making that responds 
to the priority interests of the median voter (Joughin 
and Kjaer, 2010). The preference of direct over indirect 
methods of policy implementation suggests politicians 
prefer policies that benefit a large number of people in 
the short term and are highly visible such as social 
policies. They thus prefer to win votes by delivering 
clientelist privileges rather than the more unattainable 
‘development’ or even public goods. This implies that 
elections could be a double edged sword in the policy 
processes in a democratic dispensation within a 
neopatrimonial context. Competitive elections may 
reinforce clientelism rather than counteract it because 
the governing elite would need to have an even tighter 
grip on material and coercive resources in order to 
prevent competitive patronage networks from engaging 
and threatening the state from within the system 
(Lindberg, 2003). For instance, at the time of the transition 
from a one party state to a multiparty state, the Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP) leadership threatened the populace 
by arguing that multiparty was war. Conversely, elections 
could have a programmatic effect since they induce the 
political elite to provide public goods, or at least benefits 
that are visible countrywide. In practice, both aspects of 
elections in terms of promoting programmatic policy 
interventions and fostering client-patron relationships 
could be at play at different sites and times.
As a result of these challenges, some scholars argue 
that we can understand the dynamics of policy processes 
in a country by focusing on the motivations (‘incentives’) 
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of political elites. They argue that political survival is the 
key motivation for the ruling elites who are interested 
in maintaining ruling coalitions in order to win elections. 
This motivation in turn shapes the kind of policies elites 
choose and how they are implemented. The success of 
the chosen policies is dependent on whether the ruling 
elites are able to create pockets of efficiency in the 
bureaucracy in implementing the policies or are effective 
in delivering clientelist goods to a network of supporters 
(Whitfield and Therkildsen, 2011). The bottom line is that 
ruling elites want to stay in power, and staying in power 
requires building and maintaining a political organization 
which can be achieved through clientelistic or 
programmatic means.
This makes the notion of political settlement relevant 
to understanding how policy choices and their 
implementation play out in practice. The notion of 
political settlement is, however, highly contested. 
According to Park and Cole (2009), a political settlement 
is an expression of a common understanding, usually 
forged between elites about how power is organized 
and exercised. A society’s political settlement is therefore 
manifested in the formal laws, informal norms, implicit 
understandings, specific mechanisms and ways political 
power is exercised. Khan (2010) offers a slightly different 
perspective on political settlement. He defines it as a 
balance or distribution of power between contending 
social groups and classes on which the state is based 
and one that is economically beneficial to the parties of 
a settlement. According to John and Putzel (2009), Khan’s 
definition is considered more realistic on the account 
that the idea that a political settlement refers to a 
common understanding between elites downplays the 
extent to which political settlements are bargaining 
outcomes among contending elites.
Political settlements are vital because they shape the 
field on which politics is played. This implies that political 
settlements prescribe the nature and rules of the political 
game that determine which players are playing what 
role (Di John and Putzel, 2010). Consequently embracing 
democracy per se is not adequate; the success of policy 
processes is highly dependent on the resultant political 
settlements. Moments of transition represent critical 
junctures that may make it possible to achieve 
fundamental changes to the state. This might involve 
reconfiguring power within the state or renegotiating it 
altogether especially when the economic underpinnings 
of the political settlement can no longer serve the 
interests of the key actors in a political settlement.
Understanding political settlement provides a route 
to understanding the differential performance of states 
in the developing world and the directions reforms might 
take when it comes to fundamental state functions (Di 
John and Putzel, 2009). This suggests that the character 
of political settlements might explain why similar sets 
of formal institutions such as democratic rules can have 
widely divergent outcomes. Khan (2010) argues that the 
main challenge is that political settlements in most 
developing countries are clientelistic. They are thus 
characterized by the significant exercise of power based 
on informal institutions, typically patron client 
relationships of different types. This does not, however, 
mean that developing countries are doomed altogether 
since “political settlements are continually evolving” 
(Khan, 2010: 4). Political settlements are underpinned 
by an on-going process of contestation and bargaining 
between elites and social groups and those who occupy 
positions of authority within the state, economy and 
society more widely.
This suggests that there is need to fully understand 
the key features of a political system as the basis for 
understanding the underlying dynamics of policy 
processes in the agricultural sector. In particular, policy 
choices and modalities of implementation can be 
understood by looking at the incentives produced by 
the formal and informal political institutions that 
characterize the distribution and organization of power 
(Whitfield and Therkildsen, 2011). This draws attention 
to the fact that, contrary to the highly stylized good 
governance perspective, policy processes are less of a 
linear sequence but more of a political process 
underpinned by a complex mesh of interactions and 
ramifications between a wide range of stakeholders who 
are driven and constrained by competing interests and 
the context in which they operate.
The Political System
This section examines the features of Malawi’s political 
system in order to set the context for understanding the 
dynamics of the policy processes pertaining to the FISP. 
The detailed discussion of these features helps to further 
grasp the underlying logic of the various design, 
implementation and management elements of the FISP. 
These are critical in order to provide a fairly definitive 
answer to the debate that has inspired this paper. The 
various aspects of Malawi’s political system described in 
the rest of this section provide pointers to underlying 
nature of policy processes especially in terms of who 
drives the processes, what are their incentives, what are 
their  patterns of interaction and the l ikely 
consequences.
Malawi has experienced tremendous political changes 
since the turn of the 1990s. It is a democracy with a new 
constitution that is widely considered as progressive, 
providing since 1994 for fundamental liberties and 
freedoms as well as a set of institutions to promote, 
protect and safeguard democratic governance. From 
probably the most repressive regime in the entire 
southern African region, Malawi reinstated multiparty 
democracy following both relentless donor and domestic 
pressures (Chirwa, 1998 and Dulani, 2005). The transition 
to democracy saw the ouster of the late Dr. Banda and 
the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the ascendancy 
of the United Democratic Front (UDF) with BakiliMuluziat 
the helm.
The basic structures of the state have at least taken 
shape to the extent that the liberal constitutional 
framework is generally acceptable to all stakeholders as 
the basis for organizing political competition although 
there are some challenges from time to time. The 
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democratic pattern of politics has not differed 
substantially from that projected at the transition. The 
legacy of the one party dictatorship has had an enduring 
impact on the nature and form of the post-transition 
politics. This has been particularly manifested through 
regionally based politics which has had tremendous 
impact on the policy making processes in various spheres 
as well as tendencies of recentralization of power in the 
Executive Branch of government. While the one party 
state was effectively dismantled following the transition 
to democracy in May 1994, one party politics has persisted 
at the regional levels (van Donge, 1995 and Chinsinga, 
2007). Except for the May 2009 elections, parties have 
essentially enjoyed electoral dominance in regions 
considered as their strongholds across the country, 
namely: south, centre and north. The May 2009 elections 
are an exception. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
won the elections with landslide victories both at 
parliamentary and presidential levels, but for reasons 
that may not have anything to do with regionalism dying. 
This could be attributed to the failure of the opposition 
to present any credible alternative and the impressive 
development record of the Mutharika regime between 
2004 and 2009.
One party politics at regional levels has persisted 
despite the increasing fragmentation of political parties. 
From seven political parties that contested the founding 
multiparty democratic elections in May 1994, the number 
of registered political parties in the country has swelled 
to 43. While parties attempt to establish a nationwide 
appeal, they are primarily seen as regionally based 
(Chinsinga, 2003 and Dulani, 2005). Of the 43 parties 
only two have been at the helm of government. These 
are the UDF (1994-2005) and the DPP (2005 to date).
The regional orientation of political parties in Malawi 
is strengthened by the apparent overlap between the 
major ethnic groups and regions in the country (Chirwa, 
1998). Since the state is the primary source of wealth the 
underlying logic is that chances of rapid wealth 
accumulation are enhanced if ethnic groups or regions 
elect one of their own into the State House. The serious 
battle revolves around who becomes the presidential 
candidate for a political party, although party founders, 
especially in parties that have not been in government, 
are often automatic presidential candidates. Potential 
presidential candidates from regions not deemed as a 
party’s stronghold are effectively excluded. This perhaps 
explains the undemocratic tendencies in choosing 
successors in the UDF and DPP, parties that have been 
at the helm of government since 1994. The outgoing 
Presidents are very influential in deciding their successors. 
Former President Muluzi anointed BinguwaMutharika 
as his successor after failing to change the constitution 
to allow him to run for a third term(Chinsinga, 2003 and 
Dulani, 2005). It is more or less settled that the incumbent 
has bulldozed through the DPP his choice of his brother, 
Peter Mutharika, to succeed him in the May 2014 
elections.
The political party machinery is very important in 
helping presidential candidates capture state power. 
Beyond accession to power, presidents do not rely on 
any specific elite groups in order to retain power except 
perhaps their funders. Political parties are therefore 
simply used as tools to gain power, run clientelist 
networks, select and control MPs and do little to aggregate 
public interest (Magolowondo and Svasand, 2010). There 
is little room for internal debate about issues and personal 
disagreements between and among leaders often result 
in a party split and the proliferation of small parties. The 
majority of political parties in the country are splinter 
groups from the initial seven parties that contested the 
May 1994 elections. They form when a new ‘big man’ 
contests for power and when (s)he is shoved aside. 
Diversity of opinion within political parties is perceived 
as a sign of weakness and division. In short, it could be 
argued that parties are established to advance the 
individual interests and concerns of the party leadership 
and its close allies.
The relative autonomy of the incumbent President is 
attributed to the enormous powers vested in the 
presidency both formally and informally. The question 
of expansive powers of the presidency was hotly debated 
during the transition as it was projected as one of the 
factors that entrenched dictatorship during the reign of 
the MCP regime (Banda, 1998). However, very little 
success was achieved in trimming the powers of the 
President, who thus has enormous powers to appoint a 
wide range of senior staff in government without viable 
systems of checks and balances. Broadly speaking, the 
president presides over an expansive patronage network 
which he strategically exploits in order to keep and 
maintain a tight grip on the governing coalition.
The relative autonomy of a president is further 
reinforced by the weakness of both civil society 
movements and the private sector. This and the president’s 
control over MPs, suggests that there are hardly any 
effective checks on the Executive. According to donors, 
in the 1980s the private sector existed in Malawi but it 
was not only weak but it was also owned by the state 
(Harrigan, 2001). This is because the state is the major 
dispenser of lucrative contracts. Meanwhile, most civil 
society organizations have been captured by their 
founders to serve as instruments for their livelihoods 
(Chirwa, 2000 and Chinsinga, 2006). They are mostly 
reactive instead of being proactive in their engagement 
with the state. Moreover, most such organizations are 
urban based without networks extending beyond the 
confines of the capital, yet they claim to speak 
authoritatively on behalf of the people. The regional 
orientation of politics in Malawi is further entrenched 
by the use of a simple majoritarian electoral system. 
According to Heywood (1997), in a simple majoritarian 
electoral system, the winning candidate needs only to 
achieve more votes than any other candidate (i.e. not an 
absolute majority of votes cast) to be declared winner. 
This does not oblige candidates and parties to appeal 
beyond their strongholds except through their selection 
of VP candidates, and later in choosing a cabinet. The 
only exceptions in this configuration are the chiefs who 
are often enlisted by governments in power to shore up 
Working Paper 039 www.future-agricultures.org11
their support especially in areas not considered as their 
strongholds (Chinsinga, 2006 and Moto, 1998).
The regionally fragmented voting patterns mean that 
presidents do not often enjoy similar levels of legitimacy 
across the country. To boost their legitimacy, Presidents 
have resorted to chiefs as influential among their subjects. 
Their word is trusted and respected. Former President 
Muluzi used chiefs to drum up support for his third term 
bid (Dulani, 2005 and Kanyongolo, 2009). Similarly, chiefs 
are being used to legitimize the candidacy of Peter 
Mutharika ahead of the May 2014 polls. For this reason, 
chiefs are enmeshed in a patron-client relationship 
practically with any government that comes to power. 
The chiefs are considered as an integral part of the 
Executive branch of government and their motto is 
serving the government of the day. In the last decade, 
the honorarium of chiefs has been raised by more than 
1000 percent. Although the amount of honoraria to lower 
ranking chiefs is still very low, it is much higher for the 
high ranking chiefs comparing favarourably with salaries 
of some senior civil servants (Chiweza, 2005 and 
Chinsinga, 2009).
A glimpse into the nature of Malawi’s political 
settlement is provided by Cammack, et al., (2007) and 
Cammack (2010). In both pieces of work, political culture 
is used to provide pointers to some of the key elements 
of the country’s political settlement. Political culture 
entails widely held and shared fundamental beliefs that 
have political consequences. Thus political culture 
determines the type of government institutions, how 
authority is vested in government, who is given authority 
and power in society and government, who is allowed 
to participate in policy and decision making and how 
citizens hold their leaders accountable (Gumede, 2009). 
Political culture is considered critically important because 
it sets ethical norms and standards. For this reason, 
political culture constrains the actions of politicians and 
public officials even if inclined otherwise. They thus 
refrain from taking positions or from implementing 
policies that blatantly violate the elements of political 
culture.
The main challenge for Malawi is that the one party 
political culture has persisted without major modifications. 
The multiparty political settlement is therefore to a great 
extent shaped by the one party political culture which 
has simply adjusted to the pressures of a multiparty 
political dispensation while remaining squarely intact. 
Cammack (2010) argues that Malawi’s political culture 
is expressed as a set of political behaviours and beliefs 
which are a norm even if they are non-democratic and 
anti-developmental at times, and contravene formal 
rules. The key elements of Malawi’s political culture 
include the following: prevalence of patronage, 
clientelism, opportunism and corruption, centralizing 
authoritarian tendency of the executive, relative weakness 
of the citizenry and civil society vis a vis the state, 
narrowness of the public sphere, deference to hierarchy 
and gender discrimination (Cammack, 2010).
There are several implications arising from Malawi’s 
political culture that highlight key attributes of the de 
facto political settlement. Political parties are built around 
a big man with followers drawn together because of their 
shared loyalty to him rather than a common ideology. 
Consequently issues are relatively unimportant and party 
platforms are more or less the same across parties. Formal 
rules are often ignored and a more personal, irregular 
agenda dominates when hard decisions must be taken. 
This makes it easier for politicians to advance their 
personal agendas because there is little clearly or widely 
shared understanding of what is in the public interest. 
For instance, Mutharika’s refusal to accept the court’s 
ruling on section 65 which regulates floor crossing 
among parliamentarians was sold to the public as a 
defence of national development and food security 
rather than an attack on the rule of law (Cammack, 2010 
and Mayaya, 2011).
Cammack (2010) argues that Malawi’s political culture 
is to a very great extent a reflection of the nature of the 
country’s political parties, especially in terms of how they 
are funded, the relative powerlessness of party members 
and how and why candidates are selected. She describes 
Malawi’s democracy as not bottom up arguing “it is not 
a government of or by the people except once in every 
five years at election time” (Cammack, et al., 2010: 162). 
This is compounded by the fact that loyalties for most 
Malawians are influenced by their primordial identities: 
ethnicity, regional and religious affinities. It is argued 
that these primordial identities will remain robust as long 
as the economy leaves people isolated on rural 
smallholdings and communications and education are 
not able to bring peoples across such distances and 
divides to debate, organize and campaign. This has, in 
turn, made it attractive for politicians not to base their 
campaigns on ideologies or issues but instead promise 
goods or have simply appealed to ethnic, regional and 
religious identities to gain support.
Commenting on the May 2009 elections, Cammack 
(2010) observes that there was apparent tension between 
the old political culture and an emerging political culture 
based on a relatively functioning state that delivers public 
goods and responds to the needs of an increasingly 
urbanized electorate. She concluded that “support for 
Mutharika came from the public that was relatively 
pleased with his development performance and fed up 
with the shenanigans of opposition politicians”, 
(Cammack, 2010: 180). As pointed out above, regionalism, 
religion and personal loyalties appear to have played a 
less important role in winning votes than in the previous 
three general elections.
She, however, expressed doubt as to whether the 
results of the May 2009 elections portended a radical 
transformation in Malawi’s political culture to promote 
good governance, fairer elections and faster economic 
growth. While treating the May 19 2009 elections as an 
important development, Cammack (2010) observed that 
there were no signs yet to indicate radical transformation 
was underway. She observed that political parties are 
no less owned by their patrons now than before; the 
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public sphere is still narrow and the public interest is still 
largely under-debated and unarticulated; government 
is still largely non-transparent and not overly participatory; 
and the public continues to long for development 
(especially food security), order and security, seemingly 
even at the cost of the rule of law and parliamentary 
independence.
The preceding discussion shows that Malawi’s political 
settlement is clientelist in nature. This is clearly manifested 
in its political culture which is at variance with the 
expectations of a genuine democratic dispensation. The 
regional orientated political support and recruitment 
does not provide strong incentives for parties to develop 
broad based programmes because once in power they 
can survive by delivering clientelist goods to their 
supporters. The clientelist tendencies are further 
reinforced by the apparent weak and limited mechanisms 
of accountability. Both formally and informally, the 
President as ‘the big man’ is not subjected to any form 
of stringent accountability. The prospects for political 
accountability are further limited by the existence of very 
weak civil society and private sector. As a result, public 
officials can practically get away with anything even 
though it may contravene the basic ideals of a democratic 
dispensation.
This is aggravated by a political culture that promotes 
subservience and obedience to authority without 
question. Consequently, policy outcomes are tied to 
individuals and not to policy systems, crowding out 
opportunities for policy dialogue that could further 
strengthen the technical soundness and viability of policy 
options. Political leaders care less about the technical 
viability of the policies but more about whether the 
policies will be able to deliver desired electoral outcomes 
to access and maintain themselves in power. As stated 
earlier, understanding the dynamics of the country’s 
political settlement would help to understand the 
political economy of the FISP in terms of its design, 
implementation and management since its inception in 
the 2005/06 growing season. The next section therefore 
examines various design, implementation and 
management experiences of the FISP paying particular 
attention to how they reflect and underpin the underlying 
logic of the country’s political settlement.
The Fertilizer Subsidy 
Programme
The origins of the fertilizer subsidy programme can 
be traced back to the electoral campaign leading to the 
May 2004 elections which saw the election of President 
Mutharika on a United Democratic Front (UDF) ticket. In 
these elections, the reintroduction of fertilizer subsidy 
as a strategy for addressing the question of chronic and 
pervasive hunger featured prominently. In fact, the 
distinctive feature of the 2004 electoral campaign was 
that “it reflected a strong national consensus for the 
fertilizer subsidy, as all leading candidates promised 
some kind of support to the smallholder agricultural 
sector” (Chinsinga, 2007: 4). The differences were only in 
terms of the magnitude of the subsidy and the indicative 
range of crops that would benefit from the subsidy 
programme. The ruling UDF advocated for universal 
fertilizer subsidy for maize only while the opposition 
block led by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) advocated 
for a universal subsidy programme targeting maize and 
tobacco farmers. The differences reflected agricultural 
interests of geographical enclaves considered as their 
strongholds.
UDF won the polls but did not implement a fertilizer 
subsidy programme in the 2004/05 growing season as 
implied in the electoral campaign. Instead, it implemented 
the Extended Targeted Input Programme (ETIP). The UDF 
government under Mutharika was somewhat reluctant 
to implement the fertilizer subsidy programme as implied 
in the electoral campaign because it did not want to 
jeopardize its relations with donors. Mutharika’s priority 
was to get an agreement with IMF so as to kickstart 
economic recovery, which would have been jeopardized 
if the government proceeded to implement the universal 
fertilizer subsidy programme, as many donors did not 
approve of it (Chinsinga, 2010). However, political events 
in early 2005 led to the President breaking away from 
the UDF and forming his own party, the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), which did not have any 
parliamentary representation. The UDF was thus pushed 
into opposition, which created an opposition-dominated 
legislature (Chinsinga, 2008 and Kanyongolo, 2010).
The complexion of the legislature made it extremely 
difficult for the government to resist calls to implement 
a fertilizer subsidy programme, as the MCP continued 
to call for such a programme and the President now 
needed their support. The government’s initial proposal 
was to give the subsidy to maize growers only but, taking 
advantage of their numbers in the National Assembly, 
the MCP managed to force the government to extend 
the subsidy to tobacco farmers. This was in the interest 
of the MCP since its stronghold in the centre is a major 
tobacco growing area. The government agreed to the 
MCP’s demand because otherwise the combined 
opposition threatened to use its dominance to frustrate 
the rest of the government’s legislative agenda including 
the budget. The subsidy programme was extended to 
legume seeds in the 2007/08 growing season at the 
insistence of donors as a means of facilitating crop 
diversification (Dorward and Chirwa, 2009).
The political context in which the fertilizer subsidy 
programme was conceived is critical in order to 
understand how it has evolved over time. Also, these 
developments are quite important in order to understand 
the political economy of agricultural policy processes in 
Malawi more generally. As indicated earlier, Mutharika 
was elected on a UDF ticket as a handpicked successor 
of President Muluzi. As a handpicked successor, it was 
widely expected that Muluzi would in turn continue to 
pull strings from his position as the ruling party’s 
chairman. However, barely eight months after the May 
2004 elections Muluzi and Mutharika fell out dramatically. 
While Muluzi wanted to dictate the shape and form of 
the cabinet and to have a say in government affairs, 
Mutharika was determined to create an independent 
base of political power and legitimacy, especially since 
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he had not been the architect of his own political 
campaign and had won the presidency with the slimmest 
of margins.
Mutharika’s determination to extricate himself from 
Muluzi’sgrasp was apparent in his inauguration speech, 
in which he called for a new beginning, which would be 
underpinned by inclusive governance, genuine 
commitment to poverty reduction by reorienting the 
people’s mind-set and attitudes, and a zero-tolerance 
anti-corruption strategy (Lwanda, 2005 and Phiri, 2008). 
It is the persistent tensions created by Mutharika’s desire 
to create his own political base and Muluzi’s desire to 
pull strings from behind the scenes that eventually 
culminated in Mutharika breaking away from the UDF 
to form the DPP. This led to an unprecedented 
development.
The dispute plunged the country into a state of tension 
which left it teetering on the brink of political paralysis 
until the eve of the 2009 elections. The repercussions 
were manifest mainly in acrimonious engagements 
between the government and the opposition, driven, to 
a great extent, by the imperatives of neopatrimonialism. 
Taking advantage of the strength of combined numbers 
the opposition was determined to wrestle power from 
the minority DPP government, which had only six 
legitimate MPs (elected in by-elections in December 
2005), while the government was determined to stay in 
power at all costs. This resulted, inter alia, in excessive 
judicialization and informalization of politics, as each 
party was determined to achieve its goals. Both the 
government and opposition made use of formal and 
informal means to advance their own selfish motives 
(Cammack, et al., 2007 and Chinsinga, 2008).
Despite the persistent political tension between 
government and the opposition, the period between 
2004 and 2009 is widely described as successful in terms 
of economic growth and development performance 
(Chinsinga, 2010 and Cammack, 2010). At the time 
Mutharika came to power, Malawi was in a deep fiscal 
crisis, development was stagnant, GDP fell below 
population growth rates and inflation rose to a record 
high and there was a serious breakdown in the state’s 
capacity to formulate and implement policy. However, 
within a relatively short period Mutharika and his 
experienced Minister of Finance managed to create 
stable macroeconomic conditions that saw the country 
register impressive economic growth rates for several 
successive years. Between 2006 and 2011 the economy 
consistently registered GDP growth rates above the 6 
percent threshold which is critical for a country to reduce 
poverty levels. The critical question is how has the 
fertilizer subsidy programme featured as an integral part 
of this story?
The fertilizer subsidy programme has been a huge 
success contrary to the initial reservations of some major 
donors who did not support its implementation when 
it was launched in the 2005/06 growing season (Chinsinga, 
2007 and Dorward&Chirwa, 2009). In all growing seasons 
since its launch, Malawi has consistently produced over 
500,000 metric tonnes of surplus maize against the 
national food annual requirements estimated at 2.1 
million metric tonnes. This success has invariably enticed 
other Africa governments “to take this (subsidy) path to 
revamp their agricultural sector against the World Bank’s 
stance to discourage agricultural subsidies”, (UNESCO, 
2009: 99). There are, however, several issues worthy of 
consideration that touch on the political economy of the 
agricultural policy processes. These would be critically 
important in considering the replication of the Malawi’s 
programme as a proven strategy for kick-starting the 
fledging agricultural sector across the continent.
Success and Evolution of the Fertilizer 
Subsidy Programme
The success of the programme forced a change of 
mind on the part of donors that had initially resisted its 
implementation. When the fertilizer subsidy programme 
was launched in the 2005/06 growing season, maize 
farmers were entitled to one 50kg bag of basal and top 
dressing fertilizers. Both fertilizers were sold at MK 950 
compared to the market price of MK 5000. Tobacco 
farmers were entitled to one bag of CAN and D compound 
each at MK 1450 per bag against the prevailing market 
price of MK 6500. Maize farmers had access to 3kg OPV 
maize at MK 150/3kg compared to the market price of 
MK 500/kg (Dorward and Chirwa, 2009). The distribution 
of the inputs was done entirely by two government 
agencies, namely: Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and Smallholder 
Farmer Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFM). Private sector 
companies were involved in the procurement of fertilizer 
for the programme alongside SFFRFM through a 
competitive tendering process.
Donors were motivated to engage with the 
government on the subsidy programme in order to 
contribute to the improvement of the programme’s 
design, efficiency and effectiveness (Chinsinga, 2007 and 
Mangisoni, 2007). The main thrust of the donors’ argument 
was that the involvement of the private sector would 
facilitate the diversification of the fertilizer subsidy 
programme beyond maize and tobacco which, in turn, 
would stimulate progressive and sustainable private 
sector growth and development. The private sector 
would ensure farmers’ access to other crops through the 
programme beyond maize and tobacco. Donors were 
concerned that the exclusion of the private sector from 
the fertilizer subsidy programme would slow down, if 
not reverse, gains from economic liberalization, which 
was vital to the development of a private sector-led 
agricultural growth and recovery. As a result of their 
pressure, the private sector has been consistently 
involved in the delivery of seed since the 2007/08 growing 
season and was involved in the distribution of fertilizers 
in the 2006/07 and 2007/08 growing seasons. The other 
four years (of the 6 year programme) the distribution of 
fertilizer has been restricted to the two state agencies-
ADMARC and SFFRFM (Chinsinga, 2007 and Chinsinga, 
2010).
The debate between the government and donors on 
the involvement of the private sector in both the 
Working Paper 039 www.future-agricultures.org14
procurement of fertilizer and seeds and the apparent 
insistence of the government to exclude the private 
sector in the distribution of fertilizer underlies the political 
sensitivity of the programme. The private sector was 
excluded in the maiden fertilizer subsidy programme 
because the country was reeling from the devastating 
effects of the 2004/05 hunger crisis and the government 
did not want to take a chance by involving the private 
sector in a programme in which the political stakes were 
huge. The government therefore wanted to take full 
responsibility for the programme to ensure that it 
delivered but also that it was strategically administered 
to shore up the new government’s/DPP’s fledging 
support (Chinsinga, 2007 and Dorward&Chirwa, 2009).
The minority status of the government during the 
2005-2009 period was a double-edged sword. It had a 
fairly positive impact on the technocratic orientation of 
the programme especially in the first two years since the 
government was determined to see it succeed “as a 
strategy for building up its own legitimacy since it did 
not have a support base of its own following the fall out 
of the President with UDF”3. This was inevitable because 
maize, as stated above, is at the heart of the social contract 
between the rulers and the ruled (Sahely, et al., 2005 and 
Anderson, 2011). The regime needed to demonstrate 
tangible achievements to the people to get their support 
since the President had won the May 2004 elections with 
the slimmest margin since the transition (at 36 percent) 
and his party had no parliamentary support.
As indicated earlier, the DPP government was under 
constant pressure from the opposition-dominated 
Parliament that was often threatening to invoke section 
65 which regulates MPs’ crossing the floor from one party 
to another, and to impeach the President for a series of 
serious constitutional violations. The fact that he had 
ditched the UDF riled its leadership, which was keen to 
pay Mutharika back for his treachery. Besides the DPP 
wanting to make a difference in the lives of the people 
(Kanyongolo 2010),  it wanted to demonstrate to the 
people that the strong opposition had nothing to offer 
apart from politicking, and trying to eject a well-
performing government from power.
This perhaps explains the government’s positive 
reception to the overtures of the donor agencies to the 
proposals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the fertilizer subsidy programme during the second year 
of implementation (Dorward, et al., 2007). Following the 
success of the programme in its first year of 
implementation, most donors started providing support 
to it. The government agreed to the involvement of the 
private sector in the procurement and distribution of 
both fertilizer and seed although the involvement of the 
private sector in the distribution was subsequently 
discontinued. The government further agreed to 
broadening the scope of crops involved in the subsidy 
programme, particularly the inclusion of legumes as a 
means of diversifying away from maize, improving soil 
fertility and boosting farmers’ income and nutrition. 
However, as further demonstrated below, these are the 
only technical suggestions about the improvement of 
the programme that the government has taken on board 
to improve its overall efficacy.
While working hard to deliver on development 
including food security, the government was 
simultaneously courting chiefs as a strategy for propping 
up its legitimacy (Chinsinga, 2008 and Chiweza, 2008). 
Chiefs have become important players in Malawi’s politics 
since there is evidence that they are influential in the 
lives of their subjects due to the fact that “their word is 
much respected, their praise is appreciated, and their 
example is emulated” (Chinsinga, 2006: 37). The rise to 
prominence of chiefs in the multiparty political 
dispensation is attributed mainly to the regionalistic 
orientation of politics in Malawi. Parties in power often 
turn to chiefs as a strategy for extending their reach and 
authority in areas where they have anaemic support. 
Chiefs play a key role in determining the political level 
playing field by either opening up or denying political 
space to competitors.
The Chiefs Act has been instrumental on the part of 
the government to court support of chiefs since it 
empowers the government to hire and fire them (Chiweza, 
2010). In addition, several inducements are targeted at 
the chiefs. The President promotes chiefs to higher ranks 
which was not previously the case; chiefs are now on the 
government’s payroll and in the last five years, their 
salaries have been revised upwards by over 1000 percent; 
and a housing scheme has been introduced for them. 
Salaries of some grades of chiefs are higher than the 
salary of fresh graduates in the civil service (Chinsinga, 
2008 and Chiweza, 2010). The attempts to draft in chiefs 
to bolster the regime’s legitimacy across the country have 
further strengthened and deepened patronage links 
between chiefs and the governing elite.
Several evaluations have shown that the government 
has exploited the fertilizer subsidy programme to shore 
up its popularity and legitimacy. This is the case because 
the fertilizer subsidy programme has become the 
centrepiece of its agricultural policy whose main goal is 
to achieve food security at national and household levels 
(GoM 2006 and GoM, 2008). The government has 
exploited the subsidy programme through populist 
pricing of fertilizers. Tobacco and maize fertilizer prices 
started off at MK 1, 450 and MK 950 respectively. They 
were harmonized at MK 900 in the subsequent growing 
season; reduced to MK 800 before being slashed to MK 
500 in the lead up to the May 2009 general elections. In 
the third year of its implementation, the subsidy 
programme was extended to cotton farmers and there 
were indications that it would be extended to coffee and 
tea growers during the 2009/10 season. The cotton, tea 
and coffee areas are widely perceived as strongholds of 
the governing party.
This did not happen, however. Instead the government 
even withdrew the subsidy from tobacco and cotton 
farmers during the 2009/10 growing season. The focus 
is now exclusively on maize and legume seed which is 
often not readily available to farmers. This could be 
attributed to the landslide victory of the governing party 
in the May 2009 polls. From only six seats in the previous 
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Parliament, the governing party now controls 114 seats 
out of the 193 seat legislature. In addition, the majority 
of the 33 independent legislators are aligned to the 
governing side. As a result of this victory, the DPP now 
knows its decisions cannot be challenged. The withdrawal 
of the subsidy from tobacco farmers was justified as a 
means of controlling costs for the subsidy programme 
but it can also be argued that the government now has 
considerable room of manoeuvre because of a 
substantially weakened opposition. Tobacco farmers do 
not have any voice in the government dominated 
legislature whose primary base is outside the tobacco 
growing areas. Indeed, the government discontinued 
subsidizing tobacco without any notable ramifications 
at all, whereas it could not have been able to do this 
when it was a minority government, even when it was 
clear that the programme was costly.
The fact that the government has held onto the 
distribution of fertilizer could be seen in a similar 
perspective. The private sector is involved in the 
procurement of fertilizer through a competitive tendering 
process but as indicated above it is entirely excluded 
from distribution. This reflects the fact that the distribution 
of fertilizer provides politicians with significant 
opportunities of patronage since the whole question of 
food security lies at the heart of the country’s political 
economy. According to Holden and Tostensen (2011), 
the disposition of the government underlies the fact that 
the fertilizer subsidy programme is the most expedient 
vehicle for garnering rural support. For this reason, they 
argue that government is likely to cling to it whatever 
its other merits.
Design of the Subsidy Programme
The design has been debated in several respects. 
However, the main issues of intense and protracted 
debate have included the modalities of delivering the 
subsidy packages to the beneficiaries, the mechanisms 
of accurately identifying deserving beneficiaries of the 
programme and the potential exit strategies from the 
programme (Chinsinga, 2007; Dorward&Chirwa, 2009; 
Holden &Tostensen, 2011).
The argument is that very little progress has been 
made to improve the technical robustness of the 
programme in these areas because “the President has 
had a decisive hand in both the design of [the subsidy 
programme] and its implementation and was Minister 
of Agriculture and Food Security until 2010 bearing his 
personal imprint on the direction of the programme” 4. 
This, in itself, does not automatically mean that the 
programme cannot be technically robust. The main 
concern relates to how the direct involvement of the 
president has constrained the uptake and subsequent 
implementation of potential technical improvements 
(Holden and Tostensen, 2011: 11). For instance, some 
informants observed that “improvements to the 
programme are difficult because the programme is used 
for political goals”5. It was argued that technical 
improvements “would run counter to the desire of 
politicians to add extra coupons which Ministers and 
MPs are personally responsible for distribution”6 This 
underlies the justification of the subsidy programme not 
only in terms of its stated objectives but also its underlying 
political rationale and ramifications.
This should not, however, be understood as implying 
that there have not been significant technocratic 
contributions to the design, implementation and 
management of the programme. The concern is that the 
uptake of the technocratic insights has been very low 
especially “in areas that would have positively contributed 
to the enhancement of the overall efficiency and 
effectiveness of the programme” 7. The observation of 
the informants is illustrative: “what we think should be 
happening technically is not presented to the outside 
world; we have been conditioned by the president’s 
thinking about the programme”8  In short, the technical 
improvements are difficult to implement because they 
are not in favour of the political goals of the 
programme.
The debate about the modalities of delivering the 
subsidy package has focused on two main aspects, 
namely: the use of coupons by beneficiaries to access 
the subsidy inputs and the involvement of the private 
sector in the procurement and distribution of the subsidy 
inputs, a subject that has been dealt with at some length 
in the previous section. The debate about the use of 
coupons is as old as the programme itself (Chinsinga, 
2007 and Dorward, et al., 2007).The opposition has had 
serious reservations with the use of coupons arguing 
that the coupon system is prone to manipulation and 
corruption especially when administered by a 
government that had a very weak and fragile political 
base. The government defended the use of coupons as 
a viable strategy for targeting the poorest of the poor. 
Moreover, the use of coupons works to systematically 
limit the amount of fertilizer that households could access 
justified both as a control mechanism and as an equity 
strategy. Ideally, those accessing the subsidized fertilizer 
would be only those that have been formally identified 
as beneficiaries.
The use of coupons as an allocative mechanism of the 
subsidy programme is at least in theory based on the 
area planted to maize, the number of farming households 
and soil characteristics across districts. A distribution 
matrix based on these variables is developed each year 
to guide the distribution of coupons in order to maximize 
the programme’s efficiency and effectiveness (Dorward 
and Chirwa, 2009). There is, however, evidence that the 
tender for printing as well as the distribution of coupons 
is not transparent and accountable which provides for 
frequent and substantial irregularities. In the interviews, 
many informants observed that “there are often two 
rounds of coupon distribution, formal and informal”9. 
They further observed that “informal distribution of 
coupons is presided over by political functionaries mainly 
MPs and Ministers targeting existing and potential 
supporters”10 . There are allegations that the distribution 
of coupons “favours politically important districts at the 
expense of other districts especially where the opposition 
is particularly strong” 11. This is further elaborated below. 
There are thus strong sentiments about the objectivity 
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of the allocation of coupons to the extent that some 
informants argued “the allocation of the subsidy is 
questionable; productive areas are not getting 
enough. 
If they get enough coupons, they do not get enough 
inputs for farmers to redeem their coupons since in the 
distribution of coupons and inputs, they are targeting 
those areas where there are more votes at the expense 
of guaranteeing productivity” 12.
The distribution matrices are therefore largely on 
paper. According to Holden and Tostensen (2011), the 
share of households allocated coupons varies between 
33 and 49 percent of all resident farmers in a district but 
no clear information has been provided by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Food Security as to how these 
variations come about except general statements about 
population size, maize area and soil quality. However, 
studies show that the President’s home district, Thyolo, 
has received significantly more than other districts while 
Machinga an opposition stronghold has received less 
than other districts (Dorward and Chirwa, 2010).
According to one informant “the southern region, the 
President’s region, has had a substantially bigger share 
of the subsidy the dominance of its populace 
notwithstanding”13. This was deemed “particularly 
pronounced in the election year during which households 
in southern region received an average of three coupons 
with some districts such as Thyolo, Phalombe and Mulanje 
standing out”14.
Several cases were reported in which committees at 
district levels entrusted with the distribution of coupons 
have to constantly contend with undue political 
interference from party governors at different levels, MPs 
and Ministers. Some informants observed that “there 
have been cases when these functionaries [party 
governors, MPs and Ministers] have brought their own 
lists of beneficiaries of the subsidy, replacing those 
chosen according to the stipulated guidelines, boasting 
that they are government”15. To illustrate the impact of 
political interference in the subsidy programme, a story 
was told of by-elections in a particular district during 
which the District Agriculture Development Officer 
(DADO) was transferred to the Ministry Headquarters for 
acting professionally. This allowed the subsidy 
programme to be run by the District Commissioner who 
has stronger ties to the politicians as well as chiefs. 
Consequently “the programme was administered in a 
way that ensured that the governing party manipulated 
it to achieve some political dividends” 16. The campaign 
slogan of the governing DPP was that subsidy beneficiaries 
would be only those that would have demonstrated 
commitment to vote for it.
The programme has been debated with reference to 
the soundness of its targeting criteria in order to ensure 
efficiency and effectiveness. As stated above, the 
justification for targeting the subsidy programme is that 
it ensures that poor smallholders are reached and to avoid 
large farmers benefitting disproportionately from 
subsidies (Dorward and Chirwa, 2008). It would make 
sense to target productive farmers as beneficiaries of 
the programme but “it is the political imperatives of the 
programme that makes it sensible to target poor farmers 
most of whom do not make productive use of the inputs 
as potential voters and resist any improvements that 
would have enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the programme”17. Moreover, targeting helps to 
minimize crowding out demand for commercial fertilizer 
which, in turn, “enhances the smartness of the subsidy”18. 
The concern is that the targeting criteria for the 
beneficiaries have not been very clear and consistent. 
Many informants observed that “the targeting criteria 
are vague and they keep on changing from year to year 
which simply creates confusion” 19.
The popular view is that the vagueness of the targeting 
criteria is deliberate “because it provides room for 
flexibility in the implementation of the programme 
especially since the programme is primarily a political 
programme”20. This is underscored by the apparent failure 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) 
and the National Statistical Office (NSO) to agree on the 
exact size of the rural household population in Malawi. 
Yet the actual number of households is critically important 
for determining the targeted share of beneficiaries and 
by implication for assessing the efficiency of targeting 
and possible leakage of inputs (Holden and Tostensen, 
2011). The NSO and MoAFS project the numbers of rural 
farm families at 2.52 and 3.3 million respectively but of 
particular concern is that there is no political will to 
reconcile the disparity. As one of the supporters of the 
fertilizer subsidy programme, the Norwegians sponsored 
an agricultural census which would have helped to rectify 
the results but MoAFS has reportedly been reluctant to 
release the results. The key question is what is it that 
motivates the reluctance of the government to resolve 
an issue that would enhance the integrity of the 
programme? This suggests that key players have an 
interest in keeping the picture equivocal or blurred 
because it affords opportunities for manipulation and 
fraudulent behaviour. According to Holden and Tostensen 
(2011), the failure to reconcile household data creates 
considerable room for corruption at all levels of the 
programme. Since the launch of the programme the 
number of beneficiaries has fluctuated between 1.4 and 
1.7 million. This concern is more credible when the issue 
of supplementary or second round coupons is taken into 
account (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011). They estimated 
that the second round coupons in the election year 
peaked to about 1 million resulting in enormous cost 
overrun of the planned expenditures.
The final area of debate has centred on the proposal 
by donors about developing a medium-term plan for 
the subsidy program as a critical first step toward exit. 
This debate can be traced back to the 2006/07 growing 
season. Donors have pushed for a medium term plan for 
the subsidy programme for several reasons. They argue 
the medium term plan would ensure predictable as 
opposed to ad hoc annual planning that has characterized 
the programme thus far. The medium term plan would 
clearly spell out the goals and objectives of the 
programme, lay out procedures for critical elements such 
as procurement and indicators of success or failure. The 
medium term plan would further allow for a balanced 
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planning process in the agricultural sector that would 
equally pay attention to such activities as research, 
extension and commercialization and trade among many 
others. The medium term plan would also serve as a 
planning tool for donor support. Many donors observed 
that “without a medium term plan, it is difficult for us to 
justify to our respective headquarters the basis for 
funding the subsidy programme, its success not 
withstanding”21. The donors have pushed for the medium 
term plan with “full recognition that the fertilizer subsidy 
programme is a home-grown programme but that doing 
so would enhance the quality of support and technical 
advice we offer”22.
Two drafts of the medium term plan had been 
produced by the time of the fieldwork towards the last 
quarter of 2010 but there was consensus among both 
government and donor officials that the plan would 
not have any significant impact on the design of the 
programme. This was attributed to the overwhelming 
influence of the President who until April 2010 was also 
the Minister of Agriculture and Food Security. In response 
to the demands for an exit strategy of the programme, 
the President has publicly stated that he has “never heard 
anywhere in the world about exiting from eating”23. 
Against this backdrop, the medium term plan “is widely 
seen as a gimmick on the part of the donors to force 
upon the government to exit from the programme yet it 
is home-grown” 24. The tone of the President has therefore 
set the parameters of policy engagement between 
technocrats and donors. This is reinforced by the fact 
that the subsidy programme is a successful home-grown 
grown solution to the intractable hunger problem that 
was implemented in total disregard of fierce donor 
resistance which is why none of the donors supported 
the FISP in its maiden year of implementation.
Many informants argued that the fate of the medium 
term plan for the subsidy programme exemplifies how 
technical advice toward the potential improvement of 
the programme is regarded. The popular view is that 
the medium term plan is resisted because it would hurt 
the political goals of the programme since “the scope 
for political manipulation and reaping political capital 
is widened when supporters can be rewarded with 
no effect on the number of beneficiaries” (Holden and 
Tostensen, 2011: 11). The desire at the political level is “for a 
programme that is successful but which they [politicians] 
can control with a great deal of flexibility” 25. Another view 
is that the adoption of the medium term plan and a series 
of technical improvements suggested would make the 
programme complex. The argument is that “politicians 
want to keep it simple, with straightforward messages 
which the masses can understand since it is a populist 
programme meant to achieve political goals” 26.
Given the nature of the country’s political settlement 
underpinned by excessive deference to authority, the 
room for technocratic engagement with the programme’s 
design has been limited. There have been efforts to 
improve the programme but “their implementation has 
been impossible due to the fact that the programme is 
greatly politicized”27.  Most donors observed that “there 
is a real sense of fear in MoAFS heightened by the attitude 
of the President which means that critical and controversial 
technical issues about the programme are neither raised 
with the President nor dealt with hoping that they would 
simply go away”28. Similarly most of the technocrats 
bemoaned the lack of manoeuvre for innovative policy 
analysis that would have contributed to the improvement 
of the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme 
since “it is inconceivable to contradict the views of the 
President and if you do, you are branded as a sympathizer 
of the opposition however constructive one’s views might 
be”29. Suggestions for technical improvements to the 
programme cannot fly because “they are generally not 
in tune with the underlying goals of the programme”30.
Many informants therefore argued that “the political 
imperatives of the programme are making technocrats 
dull since all they have to think about is how to distribute 
coupons, support the party in power and how to please 
political masters which does not provide any tangible 
learning about the potential improvements in the 
programme design”31. This is exacerbated by the 
numerous international awards that have recognized the 
efforts of the President in making Malawi food secure. 
While the awards serve to strengthen the political will 
for the programme, they have also negatively affected 
technocratic policy engagement. Both donors and 
technocrats argued that the awards have amplified the 
political significance of the programme to the extent 
that they “have transformed the President into the master 
of everything”32. This has invariably crowded out any 
potential for serious technocratic engagement on the 
design of the programme.
Subsidy Programme and Rent 
Seeking
There is evidence that the fertilizer subsidy programme 
has been exploited as a source of rent seeking activities 
in the award of procurement and transport contracts 
(Holden and Tostensen, 2011). A recent World Bank, et 
al., (2011) review of the procurement of fertilizer and 
transport for the subsidy programme revealed enormous 
irregularities which have greatly undermined the 
programme’s overall efficiency and effectiveness. Since 
its launch, the programme expenditures have exceeded 
the initial budgets by between 41-105 percent (Dorward 
and Chirwa, 2010).The over expenditures could be 
attributed to the fluctuations in the prices of fertilizer 
but according to the World Bank, et al., (2011) assessment 
this does not tell the full story. It is argued that the cost 
of the subsidy could have been inflated by as much as 
50 percent due to favouring of certain contractors rather 
than applying competitive pricing. These contractors 
among other include Mulli Brothers and Simama General 
Dealers who are allegedly very close to the regime. They 
reportedly played a key role in bankrolling the May 2009 
electoral campaign for the DPP as a governing party 33.
The verdict of the assessment is that the apparent 
competitive tendering exercises for both fertilizer and 
transport are not adhered to. The transparent and 
accountable tendering exercises are apparently 
smokescreens since the final results are often substantially 
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different from the initial ones. The award quantities kept 
changing between evaluations to contract signature with 
some bidders losing out completely in the process 
without specific reasons; some bidders who offered 
relatively good prices were not awarded anything without 
strong justification; and some bidders who were 
disqualified during the evaluation were brought back 
(Holden and Tostensen, 2011 and World Bank, et al., 2011). 
The review underscored the fact that the procurement 
exercises for both fertilizer and transport have been 
marred by excessive irregularities strategically influenced 
by the political machine at the highest possible level. 
Some informants observed that “there is reordering of 
decisions made on the tenders in the transparent and 
accountable manner directing who should be involved, 
the quantities assigned and the prices by the owner of 
the programme” 34.
The major concern in the assessment was that “large 
quantities were repeatedly awarded to some companies 
whose bids asked for considerably higher prices than 
those with the lower prices” (Holden and Tostensen, 2011: 
12). In addition, some of the successful companies, such 
as Mulli Brothers and Simama General Dealers, have no 
previous experience in the fertilizer industry. A particular 
concern was raised with the failure to award fertilizer 
procurement contracts to established fertilizer companies 
such as Norsk Hydro, Yara and Kulima Gold “who have 
invested extensively in the fertilizer supply systems”35. 
Most informants observed that “established fertilizer 
firms have been substituted by briefcase companies 
which are simply political cronies who are likely to exit 
the fertilizer industry once the subsidy programme 
comes to an end”36. Companies such as Yara were rejected 
on the account of inadequate logistical support in “total 
disregard of the fact that Yara had been supplying up to 
60 percent of fertilizer to Malawi before the subsidy was 
introduced and continues to supply much fertilizer to 
the commercial sector in the country”37.
In the 2009/10 season, Mulli Brothers were offered the 
largest contract even though its prices were much higher 
than those of the lowest bidders yet they only delivered 
14 percent of the NPK by the end of the initial contract 
period. MulliBrothers also dominated transportation of 
fertilizer with government paying MK 30-34/10km while 
the comparable rate for the private sector is MK22/10km 
(World Bank, et al., 2011 and Holden &Tostensen, 2011). 
The exploitation of the subsidy programme in this way 
is thus perceived as “a means of paying back political 
debts to those who supported the DPP financially to 
secure landslide victories at presidential and parliamentary 
levels”38. The discrepancies in the award of fertilizer and 
transport contracts suggest that some companies are 
making huge profits while others are left out altogether 
even if they are competitive.
The concern is that these practices are not in favour 
of investment in public goods upon which the potential 
transformation of the agricultural sector is dependent. 
The favoured companies are not necessarily credible 
fertilizer dealers but those who have emerged simply to 
exploit the largesse associated with the subsidy 
programme. They are very unlikely to invest in long-term 
fertilizer supply systems while those already experienced 
in the industry are being marginalized. The subsidy takes 
up to 75 percent of the total annual budget of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS). There is very 
little that is left for research and development, extension 
and many other functions that are vital to ensure 
sustainable transformation of the agricultural sector 
(Chinsinga, 2010 and Dorward&Chirwa, 2010). The major 
conclusion from the critical review of the subsidy 
programme is that political priorities are the major drivers 
of the programme. Consequently, there is, as consistently 
demonstrated above, strong political resistance to 
closing the loopholes in the programme that facilitate 
the extraction of rents.
The Paradox of the May 2009 
elections
Many scholars credit the historical electoral triumph 
of the DPP to the success of the fertilizer subsidy 
programme “whose implementation ended years of 
chronic hunger and food shortages, according Malawians 
the dignity they deserve as a people”39. Overall, therefore, 
it appeared that a national ethos had emerged that 
emphasized on policies and issues as determinants of 
voter choice rather than the ethnic affiliations and the 
regional bases of political parties. The May2009 election 
results were thus widely heralded as a potential turning 
point in the country’s quest for fundamental and 
sustainable democratic transformation since the results 
had, inter alia, demonstrated that “Malawians were 
anxious for a new brand of politics where leaders were 
accountable, transparent, visionary and able to harness 
diversity for the good of the nation” (Chinsinga, 2010: 
149). There are nonetheless those who argue that 
Mutharika won a landslide victory because there were 
no credible opposition candidates to challenge him.
The DPP led government had not only been successful 
in bringing to an end years of chronic hunger and food 
shortages through the subsidy programme, it has also 
presided over unprecedented economic recovery, 
improved infrastructure especially the road network, and 
demonstrated commitment to the fight against 
corruption. Since these successes had a huge effect in 
popularizing issues rather than identity considerations 
in exercising the right to vote among Malawians, the 
stage appeared to have been set for entrenching issued 
based politics “because the regime had reaped tangible 
returns for delivering public goods that had positive 
impact on the livelihood of voters” 40.
With respect to the subsidy programme, the decision 
to shelve plans to extend the subsidy to tea and coffee 
and the discontinuance of the subsidy on tobacco and 
cotton were seen as positive indicators of the 
government’s commitment to policy-based politics. This 
was because the evolution of the subsidy programme 
up to that point had been largely driven by patronage 
considerations. As stated above, the extension of the 
subsidy to cotton, tea and coffee was meant to serve 
DPP’s strongholds in the south (Chinsinga, 2010). The 
hope of a new emphasis on policy-based politics was 
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further underpinned by the fact that the President 
stepped down as Minister of Agriculture and Food 
Security (MoAFS) in April 2010. For many donors and 
technocrats, the President’s decision opened up new 
opportunities for engagement that would deal with 
issues of design of the programme in order to enhance 
its overall efficiency and effectiveness. This, however, did 
not happen, as illustrated by the failure of donor 
engagement with MoAFS on the medium term plan and 
related issues such as transparent and accountable 
procurement processes that would have enhanced cost 
efficiency of the programme. The reason for this was that, 
although the president has stepped down as the Minister 
of Agriculture and Food Security, he still maintains tight 
control over the programme. According to one informant, 
“the president has stepped down as Minister of Agriculture 
and Food Security only in name; he still effectively 
controls most of the things to do with the FISP. The 
Minister of Agriculture and Food Security cannot take 
any major decision on the FISP without consulting the 
president”41
Instead, there appears to be a dramatic regression to 
the politics as usual mode and, in many ways, with a 
great deal of intensity that has never been seen before. 
Through the MulhakowaAlhomwe, a tribal grouping to 
which the President belongs and is its patron, there is a 
palpable return to using the state as an instrument of 
patronage in tune with the tribal, ethnic and regional 
orientation of Malawi’s politics which many thought had 
been effectively dismantled by the uniqueness of the 
May 19 2009 election results (Holden and Tostensen, 
2011). One of the traders that is favoured in the award 
of inflated subsidy fertilizer procurement and 
transportation contracts is a member of the 
MulhakowaAlhomwe tribal grouping. A recent 
governance report compiled by civil society shows that 
most of the key positions in the civil service are 
monopolized by the President’s tribal grouping (CPSP, 
2010). Instead of being harnessed as a mechanism for 
facilitating transformation, the DPP’s parliamentary 
majority is being exploited for selfish political goals at 
the expense of greater common good. The DPP’s 
parliamentary dominance is being used to restrict rather 
than widen the deliberative public sphere.
The government has engaged in several practices and 
passed several retrogressive pieces of legislation in the 
post May 2009 period which do not clearly promote and 
entrench issue-based politics. Criticizing the government 
has been declared unconstitutional. There was to this 
effect a press statement released by the State House that 
threatened to ban all civil society organizations that are 
critical of its performance and to take to task all individuals 
talking ill about the government 42. The justification is 
that the overwhelming victory has given the government 
a mandate to do as it pleases. All parliamentary 
committees are chaired by DPP MPs, including those such 
as the Public Accounts Committee, the Public 
Appointments Committee and the Budget and Finance 
Committee, which play vital roles in promoting a robust 
system of checks and balances (Chinsinga, 2011). 
Traditionally, these committees have been chaired by 
opposition MPs as a way of expressing commitment to 
a strong system of checks and balances. The Local 
Government Act (LGA) has been subjected to sweeping 
constitutional amendments which ultimately amount 
to the reversal of the democratic disposition of the 
country’s local government system. In addition, the 
Electoral Law has been amended to empower the 
President to decide on the date of local government 
elections -formerly set in the LGA. The amendments were 
justified on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness but 
clearly at the expense of the democratic robustness of 
the local government system as envisaged in the initial 
framing of the legislation. The overall effect of these 
amendments is that they undermine local governments 
as a democratic arena where people can organize, 
mobilize and assert themselves for fundamental and 
sustainable democratic transformation. In other words, 
these amendments are in keeping with other 
administrative reforms and practices that empower 
central government at the expense of local authorities, 
public servants and the public. Yet local governance is 
critical for capacitating government structures for policy 
processes generally and with particular reference to 
agricultural policy processes. This is because each local 
government when fully constituted is expected to have 
several committees one of which is a committee on 
agriculture which is mandated to oversee the 
implementation of agricultural activities at the district 
level.
The irony is that the regime is turning to traditional 
leaders as a mechanism for social control. There is thus 
apparent abandonment of popular participation in policy 
processes in favour of social control through traditional 
leaders. Yet popular participation is a key mechanism for 
institutionalizing democratic practices, traditions and 
ideals in a body politic. The use of traditional authorities 
limit opportunities for citizens to engage with each other 
as well as institutions of the state in the deliberative 
public sphere over which they can influence policy 
outcomes either through their voice or voting with their 
feet. Consultations on key and contentious issues are 
often restricted to traditional leaders in their capacity as 
representatives of the people. Their positive endorsement 
of an issue is taken as endorsement by the people of 
Malawi yet, as highlighted above, traditional leaders are 
steeped in a far reaching patronage relationship with 
the governing elites (Chinsinga and Chirwa, 2011).
Concluding Remarks and 
Reflections
The paper has demonstrated that agriculture is a 
highly politically sensitive sector in Malawi. Its policy 
processes are shaped by the underlying logic of the 
country’s overarching political framework. As the 
country’s main staple, maize plays a critical role in shaping 
up the social contract between the state and the citizens. 
As a result, the legitimacy of the Malawi state is closely 
linked to its ability to make maize available either through 
subsidized production or affordable prices in the market 
(Harrigan, 2005 and Sahely, et al., 2005). The centrality 
of maize in the country’s political economy is further 
heightened by the fact that maize is a national crop due 
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to the relative homogeneity in the country’s agro-
ecological conditions. This presents the potential for 
technocratically driven agricultural policy processes 
given the dominance of the rural population within the 
framework of democratization (Ellis, et al., 2003 and 
Anderson, 2011).
However, the case of the fertilizer subsidy programme 
demonstrates that the prospects for technocratically 
driven agricultural policy processes have to contend with 
the contextual political realities and challenges that 
promote neopatrimonial rather than policy-based 
politics. The evidence from the case study demonstrates 
that the push and pull between policy and neopatrimonial 
based politics tend to skew the balance toward 
personalization of agricultural policies, driven to a large 
extent by the primacy of maize in the social contract 
between the state and the citizens. This has influenced 
and shaped the manner in which the fertilizer subsidy 
programme has been designed, implemented and 
evaluated. These have systematically been tailored to 
bolster the political fortunes of the incumbent DPP 
government by satisfying both the interests of the masses 
and the elites. This is not new. It can be traced back to 
the Starter Pack (SP) implemented in the late 1990s that 
was greatly used for electioneering purposes during the 
UDF government. The absence of clear targeting criteria, 
the failure to reconcile household statistics produced by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) 
and the National Statistics Office (NSO), the serious 
anomalies in the award of procurement contracts for 
fertilizer and transportation of inputs and the failure to 
sign up to an elaborate midterm plan for the fertilizer 
subsidy programme illustrate the precedence of political 
rather technical considerations in the design and 
implementation of the fertilizer programme. It is therefore 
not surprising that the fertilizer subsidy programme is 
widely seen as the most expedient vehicle for garnering 
rural political support in order to consolidate and retain 
the power, authority and influence of the governing elite, 
and to pay back those who have helped to fund 
politics.
This perhaps explains why the uniqueness of the May 
2009 elections alone could not fundamentally alter the 
broad contours of the country’s political settlement 
which requires changing how power is held and exercised. 
The design, implementation and evaluation of the 
fertilizer subsidy programme underlie a political 
settlement that thrives on patronage. This has, in turn, 
created a situation in which the country’s democratic 
institutions do not function in the manner they are 
expected to function (Chirwa, 1998 and Chinsinga, 
2011). 
This is worsened by a political culture that promotes 
subservience and obedience to authority without 
question. Consequently, policy outcomes are tied to 
individuals and not to policy systems, crowding out 
opportunities for policy dialogue that could further 
strengthen the technical soundness and viability of policy 
options. The incumbents care less about the technical 
viability of the policies but more about whether the 
policies will be able to deliver desired electoral outcomes 
to access and maintain themselves in power. According 
to Therkildsen and Kjaer (2009), such policies are targeted 
countrywide, have immediate, visible results, and 
implemented through the public sector rather than the 
private sector.
The fertilizer subsidy programme perfectly shows how 
it has been exploited in terms of design, implementation 
and evaluation to achieve political dividends while 
guaranteeing food security since its inception in the 
2005/06 growing season. The President had a decisive 
hand in both its design and implementation which 
underlies its justification not only in terms of its stated 
political objectives but also its political rationale and 
ramifications. While technical and professional inputs 
have proven useful to the design and implementation 
of the programme, these have almost always been 
subordinated to the political precepts and priorities 
(Holden and Tostensen, 2011). These experiences buttress 
the fact that the design and implementation of policies 
such as the fertilizer subsidy programme can be fully 
understood by thoroughly unpacking the configuration 
of power relations, incentive structures and dynamics of 
processes of change in a country context.
END NOTES
1 The author would like to thank Diana Cammack and 
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of this paper. Any remaining errors are his own.
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